In this paper, we study robust large-scale distributed learning in the presence of saddle points in non-convex loss functions. We consider the Byzantine setting where some worker machines may have abnormal or even arbitrary and adversarial behavior. We argue that in the Byzantine setting, optimizing a non-convex function and escaping saddle points become much more challenging, even when robust gradient estimators are used. We develop ByzantinePGD, a robust and communication-efficient algorithm that can provably escape saddle points and converge to approximate local minimizers. The iteration complexity of our algorithm in the Byzantine setting matches that of standard gradient descent in the usual setting. We further provide three robust aggregation subroutines that can be used in ByzantinePGD, including median, trimmed mean, and iterative filtering [22, 23] . We characterize their performance in statistical settings, and argue for their near-optimality in different regimes including the high dimensional setting.
Introduction
Distributed computing is becoming more and more important in modern data-intensive applications. In many applications, large-scale datasets are distributed over multiple machines for parallel processing in order to speed up computation. In other settings, the data sources are naturally distributed, and for privacy and efficiency considerations, the datasets are not transmitted to a central machine. An example is the recently proposed Federated Learning paradigm [52, 39, 38] , in which the data are stored and processed locally in end users' cellphones and personal computers.
In a standard worker-server distributed computing framework, a single master machine is in charge of storing and updating the parameter of interest, and a set of worker machines store the data, perform local computation and communicate with the master. In this setting, messages received from worker machines are prone to various types of errors due to data corruption, hardware/software malfunction, and communication delay and failure. These problems are only exacerbated as distributed architectures become increasingly decentralized (such as in Federated Learning); in such cases some machines may be subjected to malicious and coordinated attack and manipulation. A well-established framework for studying such scenarios is the so-called Byzantine setting [41] , where a subset of machines behaves completely arbitrarily-even in a way that depends on the algorithm used and the data on the other machines-thereby capturing the unpredictable nature of the errors. Developing distributed optimization/learning algorithms that are robust in Byzantine settings has become increasingly critical.
In this paper we focus on robust distributed optimization for statistical learning problems. In our setting, the data is generated from some unknown distribution D and stored locally in the worker machines, and the goal is to minimize a population loss function F : W → R defined as an expectation over D, where W ⊆ R d is the parameter space. Solving this problem in the Byzantine setting has attracted attention in a recent line of work [3, 10, 17, 26, 64, 65, 72] , in which much progress has been made. In particular, this body of work develops robust algorithms that are guaranteed to output an approximate minimizer of F when it is convex, or an approximate stationary point in the non-convex case. However, fitting complicated machine learning models often requires finding the local minimum of a non-convex function, as exemplified by training deep neural networks and other complicated learning architectures [35, 62, 29, 28] . It is well-known that many of the stationary points of these problems are in fact saddle points and may be far away from any local minimum [35, 28] . These tasks hence require algorithms that are capable of efficiently escaping saddle points and converging approximately to a local minimizer. In the centralized setting without data corruption and Byzantine failures, this problem has been studied actively and recently [27, 32, 12, 34] .
A main observation of this work is that, in the presence of non-convexity and Byzantine machines, escaping saddle points becomes much more challenging. The challenge manifests itself in two ways:
• Optimizing non-convex functions is harder than optimizing convex functions in Byzantine settings: When F is convex, recent works have shown that gradient descent (GD) can be robustified by combining with an appropriate robust aggregation procedure and is guaranteed to converge to a solution close to the global minimizer (with accuracy depending on the fraction of Byzantine machines) [17, 72, 3, 10] . However, when F is non-convex, GD (even robustified) may converge to the neighborhood of a saddle point that is far from any local minimizer. We demonstrate this point in Example 1 in Section 4.1.
• Optimizing non-convex functions is harder in the Byzantine setting than in the standard setting: In the standard setting (without Byzantine machines), GD is known to converge to local minimizers almost surely [44] ; more sophisticated algorithms such as perturbed gradient descent (PGD) [32] are able to escape saddle points efficiently in polynomial time [57, 67, 27, 12, 2] . However, when Byzantine machines are present, GD and PGD, even when combined with a robust aggregation procedure, may get stuck at a saddle point forever.
We demonstrate this point in Example 2 in Section 4.1.
Both examples are constructed by exhibiting a strategy for the Byzantine machines to orchestrate their messages sent to the master machine in order to manipulate GD/PGD into a saddle point. We may refer to such a strategy as saddle point attack . As shown in examples above, defending against saddle point attacks requires the development of new robust distributed optimization algorithms.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we develop ByzantinePGD , a computation-and communication-efficient algorithm that is able to escape saddle points and converge to an approximate local minimizer even in the presence of non-convexity and Byzantine machines. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first to achieve such guarantees under adversarial noise. Our algorithm aggregates the messages received from the normal and Byzantine machines, and computes robust estimates g(w), F (w) of the true gradient and function value ∇F (w), F (w) of the population loss F . To escape saddle points, we leverage the idea of injecting random perturbation to the iterates w (similar to PGD), with the crucial innovations that (i) a larger, yet carefully calibrated, amount of perturbation is used and (ii) multiple rounds of perturbation are performed. Doing so allows us to strike a balance between accuracy and robustness, using a modest number of parallel iterations.
More specifically, our main results consist of a flexible, two-step approach, which allows us to decompose the optimization and statistical components of the problem.
• We consider a general framework of optimizing the population loss function F given an inexact oracle. For each query point w, the inexact oracle returns a corrupted gradientvalue pair g(w), F (w) that satisfies g(w) − ∇F (w) 2 ≤ ∆ and | F (w) − F (w)| ≤ Ψ, where ∆ and Ψ are non-zero but bounded. Note that the values of g(w) and F (w) can be chosen arbitrarily and adversarially within the error bounds. Given access to such an inexact oracle, we show that within O( 1 ∆ 2 ) iterations, ByzantinePGD outputs an approximate local minimizer w that satisfies ∇F ( w) 2 ∆ and λ min ∇ 2 F ( w) −∆ 1/3 ; that is, w is an approximate second-order stationary point (cf. Definition 1).
• This general framework allows for the flexibility of using a variety of robust aggregation procedures, provided that they produce an inexact oracle with bounded errors ∆ and Ψ. We provide concrete examples of such robust procedures and characterize their error rates under statistical assumptions on the data-these results may be of interest in their own rights. Specifically, assume that there are m worker machines, αm of which are Byzantine; each machine stores n data points independently sampled from D. We show that the median and the trimmed mean estimators can both achieve ∆ ≈ α √ n + 1 √ nm when the dimension d of the parameter space is a constant. We further consider a more sophisticated robust procedure based on the iterative filtering algorithm recently proposed in [22, 23] , and reinterpreted via the resilience criterion in [63] . This procedure achieves the error bound ∆ ≈
√ nm , which has optimal dependence on d and is hence efficient for high-dimensional problems.
Combining the results for the above robust procedures and our general ByzantinePGD algorithm, we obtain concrete statistical performance guarantees on the output w, that is, explicit bounds on ∇F ( w) 2 and λ min (∇F 2 ( w)) as a function of α, n, m, and d. Furthermore, we argue that our first-order guarantees on ∇F ( w) 2 are often nearly optimal when compared against a universal statistical lower bound. In particular, we show that when d = O(1), the median and trimmed mean estimators achieve order-wise near-optimal statistical rates; when α = Θ(1), the iterative filtering algorithm achieves an order-wise near-optimal rate even in the high-dimensional setting with a growing d.
Importantly, our algorithm is communication-efficient: in each parallel iteration, each worker machine needs to communicate only a vector of length at most d + 1 with the master machine; moreover, the number of parallel iterations needed matches the well-known iteration complexity of vanilla gradient descent for non-convex problems in non-Byzantine setting [56] .
We emphasize that our results are established under a very strong adversary model: the Byzantine machines are allowed to send messages that depend arbitrarily on each other and on the data on the normal machines; they may even behave adaptively during the iterations of our algorithm. This is a much more challenging setting than some existing adversary models that require independence and non-adaptivity across machines and iterations (e.g., the classical Huber's contamination model [30] ), which are considered in many previous work [10, 3, 48, 74, 24] . Proving statistical error rates in our setting therefore involves a major technical challenge: the parameter iterate w and the oracle output g(w), F (w) may exhibit complicated, unspecified probabilistic dependency across all the iterations. To overcome this difficulty, we make use of careful covering net arguments to establish certain error bounds that hold uniformly over the parameter space, regardless of the behavior of the Byzantine machines; as can be seen later, our inexact oracle framework allows such arguments to be implemented in a transparent and modular manner.
Notation
Vectors are denoted by boldface lowercase letters such as w, whose k-th element is denoted by w k . Matrices are denoted by boldface uppercase letters such as H. For an integer N > 0, define the set [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N }. The ℓ 2 and ℓ ∞ norms of a vector are denoted by · 2 and · ∞ , respectively. For matrices, denote the operator norm by · 2 ; for symmetric matrices, denote the largest and smallest eigenvalues by λ max (·) and λ min (·), respectively. The d-dimensional ℓ 2 ball centered at w with radius r is denoted by B (d) w (r); we simply write B w (r) when it is clear from the context. For a differentiable function f : R d → R, we use ∂ k f to denote its partial derivative with respect to the k-th argument.
Related Work
Designing non-convex optimization algorithms that can provably converge to approximate local minimizers has received much attention in recent years. For specific problems, such as phase retrieval [11] , low-rank estimation [18, 76] , and dictionary learning [1, 67] , many algorithms are developed by leveraging the particular structure of the problems, and these algorithms either use a smart initialization [11, 68] or initialize randomly [16, 14] . Other algorithms consider general nonconvex optimization, and these algorithms can be classified into gradient-based [27, 45, 71, 4, 5, 34] , Hessian-vector-product-based [12, 2, 60, 59] , and Hessian-based [57, 19] methods. While algorithms using Hessian information can usually achieve better convergence rates-for example, O( 1 ǫ 3/2 ) in [19] , and O( 1 ǫ 7/4 ) in [12] -gradient-based methods are easier to implement in practice, especially in the distributed setting. As mentioned, although vanilla GD converges to local minimizers almost surely [44, 43] , one may need careful design to achieve convergence in polynomial time [25, 32] . Our algorithm generalizes the perturbed gradient descent algorithm in [32] , and as we show in Section 4, in the non-Byzantine setting, we can recover the results in [32] .
Optimization with inexact oracles (e.g. noisy gradients) has been studied in various settings such as general convex optimization [7, 21] , robust estimation [58] , and structured non-convex problems [6, 18, 11, 74] . Particularly relevant to us is the recent work [33] by Jin et al, who consider the problem of minimizing F when given access to only the gradients of another smooth function F with ∇ F (w) − ∇F (w) 2 ≤ ∆, ∀w. Their idea is to apply Gaussian smoothing on F . We emphasize that the inexact gradient setting considered in [33] is much more benign than our Byzantine setting, since we assume that the inexact gradient can be any vector within ∆ error, and thus the technique in [33] cannot be applied in our problem. In addition, the iteration complexity of the algorithm in [33] may be a high-degree polynomial and thus not practical for distributed implementation.
Distributed learning in the Byzantine setting has received much attention in recent years. Many of the Byzantine distributed optimization algorithms perform robust aggregation subroutines and convert the problem to optimization with inexact oracle [10, 17, 72, 70] . A more sophisticated outlier-removal algorithm has also been developed in [3] , and different distributed computing frameworks are considered in [15, 20] . In the non-Byzantine setting, a few communication-efficient algorithms have also been developed for convex problems [61, 75, 42, 73] .
Outlier-robust estimation is a classical topic in statistics [30] . One of the robust aggregation algorithms we consider is the median-of-means estimator [55, 31] , which has been applied to various problems [53, 49, 37, 50, 54] , including distributed optimization in the Byzantine setting [26, 17, 72] . It is shown in [72] that for strongly convex problems with d = O(1), median-of-means estimators lead to order-optimal statistical rates. A recent line of work develops efficient robust estimation algorithms in high-dimensional settings [9, 22, 40, 13, 63, 46, 8, 36, 47] . In the centralized setting, the recent work [24] proposes a scheme that iteratively removes outliers for gradient-based optimization. Another recent work [66] studies Byzantine distributed learning with strongly convex loss and uses the iterative filtering algorithm [22, 23] for high-dimensional robust estimation as a gradient aggregation subroutine. In this work we consider a similar subroutine, but focus on the more challenging non-convex setting.
Problem Setup
We consider empirical risk minimization for a statistical learning problem where data points are sampled from an unknown distribution D over the sample space Z. Let f (w; z) be the loss function of a parameter vector w ∈ W ⊂ R d , where W is the parameter space and assumed to be bounded with diameter D = sup w,w ′ ∈W w − w ′ 2 . The population loss function is therefore given by
We consider a distributed computing system with one master machine and m worker machines, αm of which are Byzantine machines and the other (1 − α)m are normal. Each worker machine has n data points sampled i.i.d. from D. Denote by z i,j the j-th data point on the i-th worker machine, and let
be the empirical loss function on the i-th machine. The master machine and worker machines can send and receive messages via the following communication protocol: In each parallel iteration, the master machine sends a parameter vector w to all the worker machines, and then each normal worker machine computes the gradient and the function value of its empirical loss F i (·) at w and sends the gradient-value pair to the master machine. The Byzantine machines may be jointly controlled by an adversary and send arbitrary or even malicious messages. We denote the unknown set of Byzantine machines by B, where |B| = αm. With this notation, the gradient-value pair sent by the i-th worker machine is
where the symbol * denotes an arbitrary vector. As mentioned, the adversary is assumed to have complete knowledge of the algorithm used and the data stored on all machines, and the Byzantine machines may collude [51] and adapt to the output of the master and normal worker machines. We only make the mild assumption that the adversary cannot predict the random numbers generated by the master machine.
In this paper, we consider the scenario when F (w) is non-convex, and our goal to find a local minimizer of F (w), or at least a so-called second-order stationary point of it. Note that a first-order stationary point (i.e., one with a small gradient) is not necessarily close to a local minimizer, since the point may be a saddle point whose Hessian matrix has a large negative eigenvalue. Accordingly, we seek to find an (ǫ g , ǫ H )-second-order stationary point w of the population loss function, defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Second order stationarity). We say that w is an (ǫ g , ǫ H )-second-order stationary point of a twice differentiable function
Intuitively, a second-order stationary point is an approximation to a local minimizer, since its gradient is close to zero and its Hessian matrix is close to being positive semidefinite.
In the sequel, we make use of several standard concepts from continuous optimization.
Definition 2 (Lipschitz, Smooth, and Hessian-Lipschitz Functions
Throughout this paper, the above properties are imposed on the population loss function F (·).
Assumption 1. F is M F -Lipschitz, L F -smooth, and ρ F -Hessian Lipschitz on W.
Byzantine Perturbed Gradient Descent
In this section, we describe our algorithm, Byzantine Perturbed Gradient Descent (ByzantinePGD), which provably finds a second-order stationary point of the population loss F (·) in the distributed setting with Byzantine failures. Our algorithm builds on the PGD algorithm proposed in [32] , and uses random perturbation of the iterates to escape saddle points. To combat Byzantine failures, our algorithm incorporates two new ingredients: 1) robust algorithms for aggregating the gradients and function values collected from the worker machines, and 2) multiple rounds of perturbation for boosting the probability of escaping saddle points. We elaborate on these ingredients below.
It is well-known that natively aggregating the workers' message using standard averaging can be skewed to output an arbitrary sub-optimal solution by even just a single Byzantine machine. In view of this, we introduce two subroutines,
collected from the workers. This robust aggregation ensures that the estimations are accurate up to some thresholds, uniformly across W. We formalize the accuracy guarantee of GradAGG and ValueAGG using the terminology of inexact oracle.
Definition 3 (Inexact First-order Oracle). We say that GradAGG and ValueAGG provide a (∆, Ψ)inexact oracle for the population loss F (·) if, for every w ∈ W, we have
In this section, we treat these two subroutines as black boxes; in Section 5, we discuss several robust aggregation algorithms and characterize their inexactness (∆, Ψ). We emphasize that in the Byzantine setting, the output of GradAGG and ValueAGG can take adversarial values (within the error bounds); for example GradAGG{ g i (w)} m i=1 may output an arbitrary vector in the ball B ∇F (w) (∆), and this vector can depend on the data on all machines and all previous iterations of the algorithm. The use of robust aggregation with bounded inexactness, however, is not yet sufficient to guarantee escaping saddle points successfully. Below we provide two examples demonstrating this point. These examples illustrate the challenges due to non-convexity and Byzantine attack, and provide insights for the design of our ByzantinePGD algorithm to be presented in Section 4.2.
Challenges of Escaping Saddle Points in the Adversarial Setting
We provide two examples showing that in non-convex setting with saddle points, inexact oracle can lead to much worse sub-optimal solutions than in the convex setting, and that in the adversarial setting, escaping saddle points can be inherently harder than the adversary-free case.
Consider standard gradient descent using exact or ∆-inexact gradients. Our first example shows that Byzantine machines have a more severe impact in the non-convex case than in the convex case.
Here F (1) is strongly convex with a unique local minimizer w * = 1, whereas F (2) has two local (in fact, global) minimizers w * = ±1 and a saddle point (in fact, a local maximum) w = 0. Proposition 1 below (proved in Appendix A.1) shows the following: for the convex F (1) , gradient descent (GD) finds a near-optimal solution with sub-optimality proportional to ∆, regardless of initialization; for the nonconvex F (2) , GD initialized near the saddle point w = 0 suffers from an Ω(1) sub-optimality gap. (Clearly the latter is also true for PGD proposed in [32] with an insufficient amount of perturbation.) Proposition 1. Under the setting above, the following holds. (i) For F (1) , starting from any w 0 ∈ W, GD using a ∆-inexact gradient oracle finds a w with
(ii) For F (2) , there exists an adversarial strategy such that starting from a w 0 sampled uniformly from [−r, r], GD with a ∆-inexact gradient oracle outputs a w with F (2) (w)−F (2) (w * ) ≥ 9 64 , ∀w * = ±1, with probability min{1, ∆ r }. Our second example shows that escaping saddle points is much harder in the Byzantine setting than in the non-Byzantine setting.
Example 2. Let d = 2, and assume that in the neighborhood B 0 (R) of the origin, F takes the quadratic form F (w)
The origin w 0 = 0 is not an (ǫ g , ǫ H )-secondorder stationary point, but rather a saddle point. Proposition 2 below (proved in Appendix A.2) shows that exact GD escapes the saddle point almost surely, while GD with an inexact oracle fails to do so. Proposition 2. Under the setting above, if one chooses r < R and sample w from B 0 (r) uniformly at random, then: (i) Using exact gradient descent, with probability 1, the iterate w eventually leaves B 0 (r). (ii) There exists an adversarial strategy such that, when we update w using ∆-inexact gradient oracle, if ∆ ≥ λr, with probability 1, the iterate w cannot leave B 0 (r); otherwise with probability
In fact, part (ii) above holds (with a different probability of being stuck in B 0 (r)) even if the iterates are pushed to the boundary of B 0 (r); see the remark in Appendix A.2. This example is proved using the fact that if the current iterate is near the saddle point, the adversary can completely zero out the second coordinate of the gradient vector, which corresponds to the descent direction.
The above examples show that the adversary can significantly alter the landscape of the function near a saddle point. We counter this by exerting a large perturbation on the iterate so that it escapes this bad region. The amount of perturbation is carefully calibrated to ensure that the algorithm finds a descent direction "steep" enough to be preserved under ∆-corruption, while not compromising the accuracy. Multiple rounds of perturbation are performed, boosting the escape probability exponentially.
holds locally around the origin, not globally; otherwise F (w) has no minimum.
Algorithm 1: Byzantine perturbed gradient descent
Algorithm
We now describe the details of our algorithm, given in the left panel of Algorithm 1. In each parallel iteration of the algorithm, the master machine sends the current iterate w to all the worker machines, the worker machines send back the gradient-value pairs at w. The master machine aggregates the workers' gradients using GradAGG and computes a robust estimate g(w) of the population gradient ∇F (w). The master machine then performs a gradient descent step using g(w). This procedure is repeated until it reaches a point w with ∇F ( w) 2 ≤ ǫ for a pre-specified accuracy ǫ.
At this point, w may be a saddle point whose Hessian has a large negative eigenvalue. To escape this potential saddle point, the algorithm invokes the Escape subroutine (right panel of Algorithm 1), which performs C rounds of perturbation-and-descent operations. In each round, the master machine perturbs w randomly and independently within the ball B w (r). Starting from the perturbed vector, the algorithm conducts T th parallel iterations of robust gradient descent to obtain w ′ . If we observe sufficient decrease in function value, i.e., F (w ′ ) − F ( w) ≤ −F th , where F is a robust function estimate using ValueAGG, we know that w is a saddle point and we resume robust gradient descent starting from w ′ . If after C rounds no sufficient decrease in function value is observed, we claim that w is a second-order stationary point of F (w) and outputs w.
Convergence Guarantees
In this section, we provide the theoretical results which guarantee that Algorithm 1 converges to a second-order stationary point. Let F * := min w∈W F (w). We first state a technical assumption on the parameter space W. The assumption ensures that the iterates of the algorithm stay in W. Doing so streamlines our analysis, as our main focus is on robustness.
Assumption 2. We assume that W contains the ℓ 2 ball B w0
We can now state our main convergence guarantee for ByzantinePGD.
Theorem 1 (ByzantinePGD). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and assume that GradAGG and ValueAGG provide a (∆, Ψ)-inexact oracle for F (·). Choose the parameters for Algorithm 1 as follows: C ≥ 3, ǫ ≥ 3∆, step-size η ≤ 1 LF ; given any δ ∈ (0, 1), set
ρF . Then, with probability at least 1 − δ, the output of Algorithm 1, denoted by w, satisfies the bounds
and the algorithm terminates within 6C(F (w0)−F * ) ηǫ 2 parallel iterations.
We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B. 2 Below let us parse Theorem 1 and discuss its implications.
Achievable guarantees for second-order stationary points. Given a (∆, Ψ)-inexact oracle, suppose that we aim to find an (ǫ g , ǫ H )-second-order stationary point with the smallest possible ǫ g and ǫ H . Consider the regime ∆ = o(1); this is a reasonable assumption since we see in Section 5 that ∆ often approximately takes the form α √ n + 1 √ nm , where α ∈ [0, 1] and n, m → ∞. Set ǫ and r to their minimum values given in Theorem 1; that is, ǫ = 3∆ and r = O(∆ 2C−4 3C−1 ). We see that the first-and second-order guarantees (3) 3 We thus have the following informal observation. 
Here the O(∆) first-order guarantee is order optimal, since we only have a ∆-inexact gradient oracle. It is currently unclear to us whether the O(∆ 1/3 ) second-order guarantee is optimal. In terms of the iteration complexity, it is well-known that for a smooth non-convex F (·), gradient descent requires at least 1
; our result matches this complexity bound.
The exact-oracle setting. We next consider the regime where ∆, Ψ → 0, in which case the desired accuracy ǫ can be set to an arbitrarily small value. In this regime, the second term in (2) becomes the dominant term, so choosing r = ǫ LF leads to the following guarantee. Observation 2. Under the above setting, Algorithm 1 with any fixed ǫ > 0 and r = ǫ LF converges to a (O(ǫ), O(ǫ 1/2 ))-second-order stationary point of F (·) within O( 1 ǫ 2 ) parallel iterations. In this case, we recover, up to logarithmic factors, the results in [32] (for both stationarity guarantees and iteration complexity) of the perturbed gradient descent algorithm in the exact oracle setting.
As a final note, our results are in fact not restricted to the Byzantine distributed learning setting. They apply to any non-convex optimization problems (distributed or not) with inexact information for the gradients and function values. Therefore, we believe our results may find applications in a broader range of problems.
Robust Estimation of Gradient and Function Value
The results in the previous section apply as long as one has two robust subroutines GradAGG and ValueAGG that provide a (∆, Ψ)-inexact oracle. In this section, we discuss three concrete examples of such subroutines: median, trimmed mean, and a high-dimension robust estimator based on the iterative filtering algorithm [22, 23, 63] . In particular, we characterize their inexactness (∆, Ψ) under the statistical setting in Section 3, where the data points are sampled from an unknown distribution D.
To this end, let us denote the outputs of the two subroutines by g(w) :
where g i (w) and F i (w) are defined in equation (1) . We use the standard notions of sub-Gaussian/exponential random vectors.
Definition 4 (Sub-Gaussianity and Sub-exponentiality). A random vector x with mean µ is said
Median and Trimmed Mean
The median and trimmed mean operations are two widely used robust estimation methods. We apply these operations in a coordinate-wise fashion to build GradAGG and ValueAGG. Formally, for vectors
. , x m k } obtained by removing the largest and smallest β fraction of its elements.
For robust estimation of the gradient in the Byzantine setting, the error bounds of median and trimmed mean have been studied in [72] . We can extend these bounds to the estimation of function values, under the following Lipschitz/smoothness assumption on each loss function f (·; z).
Assumption 3. For any z ∈ Z, we assume that f (·; z) is M -Lipschitz, and that the k-th partial 
With these notations, we have the following guarantee for the median-based algorithm, which is proved in Appendix G.1. (In Theorems 2, 3 and 4 below, we use the big-tilde-O symbol O to hide universal constants and logarithmic factors.) Theorem 2 (Median). Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Assume that
for some constant c 1 , c 2 > 0. Then, with probability 1−o(1), GradAGG ≡ med and ValueAGG ≡ med is a (∆ med , Ψ med )-inexact oracle with
For the trimmed mean algorithm, we assume that for each w ∈ W, the random variable ∇f (w; z) is ξ g -sub-exponential and f (w; z) is ξ f -sub-exponential. In this setting we have the following guarantee, which is proved in Appendix G.1.
Iterative Filtering Algorithm
A limitation of the median and trimmed mean is that their inexactness parameters ∆ and Ψ scale sub-optimally with the dimension d of the parameter space. For example, even if each partial derivative is of size O(1), the quantity v g in Theorem 2 is of the order O( √ d), leading to an α √ d √ n factor in ∆ med . In this case, for Theorem 2 to be non-trivial, the fraction of Byzantine machines α needs to shrink as d grows. Such dimension dependence is not an artifact of our analysis, but rather fundamentally unavoidable for the median and trimmed mean estimators [22, 40] .
As mentioned in Section 2, a recent line of work seeks to improve the dimension dependence by using higher order information beyond the mean and median. Here, we consider the iterative filtering algorithm [22, 23, 63] and use it to build the subroutines GradAGG and ValueAGG. We relegate the details of the iterative filtering algorithm to Appendix G.2. Here, we note that the iterative filtering algorithm is originally proposed for robust mean estimation for Gaussian distribution in [22] , and extended to sub-Gaussian distribution in [23] ; then algorithm is reinterpreted in [63] . In Appendix G.2, we present the algorithm using the interpretation in [63] . Below we characterize their inexactness parameters under the assumption that for each w ∈ W, ∇f (w; z) is ζ g -sub-Gaussian and f (w; z) is ζ f -sub-Gaussian. Let Σ(w) be the covariance matrix of ∇f (w; z), σ g := sup w∈W Σ(w) 1/2 2 , and σ f := sup w∈W (Var(f (w; z))) 1/2 . We also assume that for each z, f (·; z) is M -Lipschitz and L-smooth. (In the following theorem M and L only appear in the logarithmic factors, so we hide them in O). Under this setting, we have the following bounds on the inexactness parameter of the iterative filtering algorithm.
Theorem 4 (Iterative Filtering). Suppose that we use the iterative filtering algorithm described in Appendix G.2 for GradAGG and ValueAGG, and assume that α ≤ 1 4 . With probability 1 − o(1), GradAGG and ValueAGG is a (∆ ftr , Ψ ftr )-inexact oracle with
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix G.3. We note that a very recent work [66] also considers the iterative filtering subroutine for the Byzantine setting with strongly convex loss functions. They assume that the gradients are sub-exponential and d ≤ O( √ mn). Here our results apply to the non-convex case and do not require the aforementioned condition d (which may therefore scale, for example, linearly with the sample size mn), but we impose a stronger assumption of sub-Gaussian gradients.
Comparison and Optimality
In Table 1 , we compare the above three algorithms in terms of the dependence of their gradient inexactness ∆ on the problem parameters α, n, m, and d . We see that when d = O(1), the median and trimmed mean algorithms have better inexactness due to better dependence on α. When d is large, iterative filtering becomes preferable. Table 1 : Statistical bounds on gradient inexactness ∆. We assume that for all ∀ w and u with u 2 = 1, the one-dimensional projection ∇f (w; z) − ∇F (w), u has O(1) characteristics (variance, skewness, sub-Gaussian or sub-exponential parameters, etc). Thus, we have vg = O( √ d), sg, ξg, σg, ζg = O(1).
Recall that according to Observation 1, with ∆-inexact gradients the ByzantinePGD algorithm converges to an (O(∆), O(∆ 1/3 ))-second-order stationary point. Combining this general result with the bounds in Table 1 , we obtain explicit statistical guarantees on the output of ByzantinePGD. To understand the statistical optimality of these guarantees, we provide a converse result in the following observation. We prove Observation 3 in Appendix G.4. In view of this observation, regarding the first-order guarantee (i.e., on ∇F ( w) 2 ), we see that up to logarithmic factors, trimmed mean is orderoptimal if d = O(1), the median is order-optimal if d = O(1) and n m, and iterative filtering is order-optimal if α = Θ(1). The statistical optimality of their second-order guarantees (i.e., on the minimum eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix) are currently unclear, and we believe this is an interesting problem for future investigation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study security issues that arise in large-scale distributed learning because of the presence of saddle points in non-convex loss functions. We observe that in the presence of non-convexity and Byzantine machines, escaping saddle points becomes much more challenging. We develop ByzantinePGD, a computation-and communication-efficient algorithm that is able to provably escape saddle points and converge to a second-order stationary point, even in the presence of Byzantine machines. We also discuss three different choices of the robust gradient and function value aggregation subroutines in ByzantinePGD-median, trimmed mean, and the iterative filtering algorithm. We characterize their performance in statistical settings, and argue for their near-optimality in different regimes including the high dimensional setting.
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Appendix A Proofs of Examples of Saddle Point Attacks
In this section, we provide the proofs for the saddle point attack examples in Section 4.1.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since
Thus, the adversarial oracle can always output g(w) = 0 when w ∈ [−∆, ∆], and we have | g(w) − ∇F (2) 
, the iterate can no longer move with this adversarial strategy. Then, we have F (2) 
The result for the convex function F (1) is a direct corollary of Theorem 1 in [72] .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Sample w 0 uniformly at random from B 0 (r), and we know that with probability 1, w 0,2 = 0. Then, by running exact gradient descent w t+1 = w t − η∇F (w t ), we can see that the second coordinate of w t is w t,2 = (1 + ηλ) t w 0,2 . When w 0,2 , we know that as t gets large, we eventually have w t,2 > r, which implies that the iterate leaves B 0 (r).
On the other hand, suppose that we run ∆-inexact gradient descent, i.e., w t+1 = w t − η g(w t ) with g(w t ) − ∇F (w t ) 2 ≤ ∆. In the first step, if |w 0,2 | ≤ ∆ λ , the adversary can simply replace ∇F (w 0 ) with g(w 0 ) = [w 1 , 0] ⊤ (one can check that here we have g(w 0 ) − ∇F (w 0 ) 2 ≤ ∆), and then the second coordinate of w 1 becomes 0, i.e., w 1,2 = 0. In the following iterations, the adversary can keep using the same strategy and the second coordinate of w never changes, and then the iterates cannot escape B 0 (r), since F (w) is a strongly convex function in its first coordinate. To compute the probability of getting stuck at the saddle point, we only need to compute the area of the region {w ∈ B 0 (r) : |w 2 | ≤ ∆ λ }, which can be done via simple geometry.
Remark. Even if we choose the largest possible perturbation in B 0 (r), i.e., sample w from the circle {w ∈ R 2 := w 2 = r}, the stuck region still exists. We can compute the length of the arc { w 2 = r : |w 2 | ≤ ∆ λ } and find the probability of stuck. One can find that when ∆ ≥ λr, the probability of being stuck in B 0 (r) is still 1, otherwise, the probability of being stuck is 2 π (arcsin( ∆ λr )).
B Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that we assume GradAGG and ValueAGG can provide (∆, Ψ)-inexact oracle, i.e., for every w ∈ W,
Throughout the proof, we assume that the iterates w stays inside W. At the end of the proof, we will see that Assumption 2 guarantees that this indeed happens. We first provide a lemma that characterizes the decrease in function value in each iteration of gradient descent with inexact oracle. Lemma 1. Suppose that η ≤ 1/L F . For any w ∈ W, if we run the following inexact gradient descent step:
with g(w) − ∇F (w) 2 ≤ ∆. Then, we have
Proof. Since F (w) is L F smooth, we know that
Then, we proceed to prove Theorem 1. Let ǫ be the threshold on g( w) 2 that the algorithm uses to decide whether or not to add perturbation. Choose ǫ ≥ 3∆. Suppose that at a particular iterate w, we observe g( w) 2 > ǫ. Then, we know that
According to Lemma 1, by running one iteration of the inexact gradient descent step, the decrease in function value is at least
On the other hand, suppose that we observe g( w) 2 ≤ ǫ, but λ min (∇ 2 F ( w)) is negative and has relatively large absolute value, then, the following lemma shows that by adding perturbation and then running inexact gradient descent for T th iterations, we can still have enough decrease in function value. In the following analysis, we treat the perturbation radius r as a parameter that we can choose within some range. At the end of the proof, we discuss the condition that r needs to satisfy.
LF . Assume that at w, we observe g( w) 2 ≤ ǫ, and the smallest eigenvalue of H := ∇ 2 F ( w) satisfies
Sample w 0 from B w (r) uniformly at random, and run the following inexact gradient descent oper-
√ ρF LF r steps. Then, with probability at least 1 −
We prove Lemma 2 in Appendix C. Lemma 2 implies that if we try the perturbation-and-descent operation C rounds, independently, the probability that the event in (8) never happens is at most
C . In the following analysis, we first condition on the fact that when (7) is satisfied, we obtain enough decrease in function value as in (8) with in C rounds, and then analyze the failure probability via union bound. Here, we note that since we do not have access to the exact value of F (·), and can only observe F (w) with | F (w) − F (w)| ≤ Ψ. We assume that Ψ ≤ (rLF ) 3 
On the other hand, if the algorithm does not terminate, i.e., (9) is satisfied, then we must have
Thus, after the perturbation step, as long as the algorithm does not terminate, during the T th iterations of the round that the algorithm escapes the saddle point, we have the average decrease in function value per iteration:
By combining (6) and (10), we know that as long as the algorithm does not terminate, in each iteration, we can decrease the function value of F (·) by at least η 6 ǫ 2 . However, the function value can decrease at most F (w 0 ) − F * , and thus the algorithm must terminate within
inexact gradient descent iterations. Here, we only count the iterations that effectively decreases the function value (we call them the effective iterations). During the saddle point escaping stages, if in a particular round the algorithm cannot escape the saddle point, the iterations in that round are not included in (11) . Let w be the final output of the algorithm. Then, we have g( w) 2 ≤ ǫ and thus ∇F ( w) 2 ≤ ǫ + ∆. Since the algorithm terminates, we have
According to Lemma 2, we know that λ min (∇F 2 ( w)) ≥ −720 ρ F L F r log 4rL F ∆ .
We now analyze the failure probability of the algorithm and choose proper perturbation radius r.
Since we run at most 6(F (w 0 )−F * ) ηǫ 2
iterations and for each saddle point escaping stage, we run T th effective iterations. The number of saddle point escaping stages is at most
Then, according to Lemma 2 and union bound, we know that the failure probability is at most
Then, to guarantee that the failure probability is at most δ, we need to choose
where C 0 = (2 C 1080) 2 3C−1 . Since we also need r ≥ ǫ LF , we obtain the choice of r in (2). As for the total number of parallel iterations, since in each stage of escaping saddle points, we run at most C rounds of perturbation-and-descent, we know that the total number of parallel iterations is at most C 6(F (w0)−F * )
We finalize the proof by showing that Assumption 2 guarantees that w stays in W. Since we assume that F (w) is M F -Lipschitz, and g(w) − ∇F (w) 2 ≤ ∆ for all w, we know that g(w) 2 ≤ M F + ∆. Taking the perturbation operation into consideration, we know that in each iteration, we can move w up to M F + ∆ + r Euclidean distance. Since we have at most
effective parallel iterations, according to Assumption 2, we know that w stays in W.
C Proof of Lemma 2
In this lemma, we analyze the probability of escaping a saddle point by conducting one round of perturbation-and-descent operations. We need to use the following lemma in the proof.
Let u 0 , y 0 ∈ B w (r) be two points such that y 0 = u 0 + µe, where e is the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of H, and µ ≥ ∆ √ ρF LF r . Let {u t } and {y t } be two sequences generated by the following two iterations:
and
We prove Lemma 3 in Appendix D. Intuitively, Lemma 3 shows that if we start from some u 0 ∈ B w (r), run T th inexact gradient descent steps, but do not obtain enough decrease in function value, then, we can move u 0 along the ±e direction with at least distance µ, and the new starting point can provide us with large enough decrease in function value. Define the stuck region W S ⊂ B w (r) be the set of points w 0 such that when we start from w 0 , run T th inexact gradient descent steps, w t = w t−1 − η g(w t−1 ) and the final iterate w T th has F (u T th ) − F (u 0 ) > − (rLF ) 3/2 2 √ ρF . Since when we conduct the perturbation step, the starting point w 0 is uniformly distributed in B w (r), to bound the probability of getting stuck at w 0 , it suffices to bound the volume of W S . Let 1 WS (w) be the indicator function of the set W S . For any w ∈ R d , let w (1) be the projection of w onto the e direction, and w (−1) ∈ R d−1 be the remaining component of w. Then, we have
Then, we know that the probability of getting stuck is
where we use the fact that Γ(x+1) Γ(x+ 1 2 ) < x + 1 2 for any x ≥ 0. On the other hand, by the smoothness of F (·), we have
where we use the fact that r ≤ LF 225ρF . This implies that if w 0 / ∈ W S , we have
which completes the proof.
D Proof of Lemma 3
Since the noise in the gradient steps can be adversarial, we need to ensure that ǫ > ∆; otherwise we may never reach the perturbation step. Since g( w) − ∇F ( w) 2 ≤ ∆, we know that ∇F ( w) 2 ≤ ∆+ ǫ ≤ 2ǫ. Recall that we generate a sequence of points {u t } via (12), where g(u t )− ∇F (u t ) 2 ≤ ∆ for every t. In the following lemma, we show that if the inexact gradient descent starting from u 0 does not decrease the function value, then all the iterations must be constrained in a small ball around u 0 . We use the quadratic approximation:
LF , and u 0 − w 2 ≤ r. Assume that at w, we observe that g( w) 2 ≤ ǫ. Let {u t } be a sequence of points generated by (12) . Define
Then, for all t < T , we have u t − u 0 2 ≤ rLF ρF . We prove Lemma 4 in Appendix E. Let e be the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of H. We proceed to consider a point y 0 ∈ B w (r) such that
for some µ > 0. This means that y 0 is generated by moving u 0 along the e direction. Again, starting from y 0 , we can generate a sequence of points {y t } via (13) , where g(y t ) − ∇F (y t ) 2 ≤ ∆ for every t. The following lemma shows that if the sequence {u t } is constrained in a small ball, then the sequence {y t } is able to decrease the function value.
Let u 0 , y 0 ∈ B w (r) be two points such that y 0 = u 0 + µe, where e is the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of H, and µ ≥ ∆ √ ρF LF r . Let {u t } and {y t } be two sequences generated by (12) and (13), respectively. Define
Then, if u t − u 0 2 ≤ rLF ρF for all t < T , then we have T < 1 180η
√ ρF LF r .
We prove Lemma 5 in Appendix F. Now we proceed to prove Lemma 3. Let
√ ρF LF r = T th . We consider two cases: 1) T 1 ≤ T 2 and 2) T 1 > T 2 . For the first case, we have
where the first inequality is due to Taylor expansion, the second inequality is due to the definition of F u (w) in (14), the third inequality is due to the definition of T 1 and Lemma 4, the fourth inequality is due to r ≤ LF 225ρF . Then, according to Lemma 1, we have
where we use the fact that ∆ < ǫ ≤ rL F . For the second case, i.e., T 1 > T 2 , define
According to Lemmas 4 and 5, we know that there must be T 3 ≤ T 2 . Using the same argument as in (16) , we know that F (y T3 ) − F (y 0 ) ≤ − 2(rLF ) 3/2 3 √ ρF
. Then, we have
E Proof of Lemma 4
We note that although in the statement of the lemma, we choose r ∈ [ ǫ LF , LF 225ρF ], in this proof, we only use the fact that r ≥ ǫ LF and that r ≤ LF ρF . For simplicity, define F th :
. Without loss of generality, set u 0 = 0. Let δ t := g(u t ) − ∇F (u t ), and we know that δ t 2 ≤ ∆. Then, we have
where Q t := 1 0 ∇ 2 F (θu t )dθ − H. By the Hessian Lipschitz property of F (·), we know that
and by the smoothness of F (·), we know that
where the last inequality is due to the fact that ǫ > ∆ and that r ≥ ǫ/L F . We now compute the projection of u t in different eigenspaces of H. Let S be the subspace spanned by all eigenvectors of H whose eigenvalue is less than −λ, where λ := 180 √ ρ F L F r. Let S c be the subspace of remaining eigenvectors. Let α t and β t be the projection of u t onto S and S c , respectively, i.e., α t = Π S (u t ) and β t = Π S c (u t ). Then, according to (17) , we obtain
By definition of T , we know that for all t < T ,
Using the fact that u t
which yields
Now we use induction to show that for all t < T ,
We can see that (23) holds when t = 0. Assume that (23) holds for all τ ≤ t. Consider t + 1 < T . It is easy to check that the first and third term in (22) satisfy (23), and thus we only need to check the second and fourth term. We first bound β t+1 2 . Let H = UΛU ⊤ be the eigen-decomposition of H. Let Λ S and Λ S c be two diagonal matrices corresponding to the eigenvalues of H that are less than −λ and greater than or equal to −λ, respectively. Let U S and U S c be the matrices whose columns correspond to the eigenvectors of Λ S and Λ S c , respectively. Then, we can write
Since β t is in the span of U S c , we know that Hβ t = H S c β t for any t. According to (21) , we have
where ξ t := Π S c (Q t u t ) + Π S c (∇F (0)) + Π S c (δ t ). We can then bound the ℓ 2 norm of ξ t by
where the first inequality is due to (18) , (19) , and the fact that δ t 2 ≤ ∆, the second inequality is due to the induction hypothesis, and the third inequality is due to the fact that r ≤ LF ρF . Then, we have β t+1 2 ≤ (1 + ηλ) β t 2 + 6ηrL F , and since β 0 = 0, we have
where the third inequality is due to the fact that T ≤ 1 ηλ and that (1 + ηλ) 1 ηλ < 3. Thus, for t + 1, we have 10 β t+1 2 ≤ 180 rLF λ . We proceed to bound β ⊤ t+1 Hβ t+1 = β ⊤ t+1 H S c β t+1 . Since we have
we obtain
where the inequality is due to (24) . Let {λ i } be the eigenvalues of H S c . By definition, we know that λ i ∈ [−λ, L F ] for every i. Since the eigenvalues of (
For every λ i ≥ 0, since η ≤ 1/L F and thus 1 − ηλ i ≥ 0, we can apply AM-GM inequality and obtain
.
For every λ i < 0, it is easy to check that the function h(x) = x(1−ηx) τ1+τ2 monotonically increases on [−λ, 0], and thus it suffices to prove a bound when λ i = −λ. In this case, we have
Therefore, according to (25) , we have
For the first term, by rearranging the summation, we have
For the second term, we have
where the last two inequalities are due to the fact that (1+ηλ) T ≤ (1+ηλ) 1 ηλ < 3. Then, according to (26) , we have
Then, we can check that the second term in (22) , and obtain
which proves that u t+1 ≤ 180 rLF λ = rLF ρF .
F Proof of Lemma 5
We again note that although in the statement of the lemma, we choose r ∈ [ ǫ LF , LF 225ρF ], in this proof, we only use the fact that r ≥ ǫ LF and that r ≤ LF ρF . Without loss of generality we set u 0 = 0. Thus, we have
where the second inequality is due to the fact that we choose r ≤ LF ρF . Define v t := y t − u t , δ t := g(u t ) − ∇F (u t ), and δ ′ t := g(y t ) − ∇F (y t ). Then we have
where
By the Hessian Lipschitz property, we know that
According to the condition in Lemma 5, we know that u t 2 = u t − u 0 2 ≤ rLF ρF , for all t < T . In addition, according to Lemma 4, y t − y 0 2 ≤ rLF ρF , for all t < T . We also know that
where the inequality is due to (27) . This implies that y t 2 ≤ 3 rLF ρF , and we further have
By combining these facts with (30) , we obtain
We let ψ t be the norm of the projection of v t onto the e direction, and φ t be the norm of the projection of v t onto the remaining subspace. By definition, we have ψ 0 = µ ≥ ∆ √ ρF LF r > 0 and φ 0 = 0. According to (28) and (32), we have
We now use induction to show that for any t < T , we have ψ t ≥ ψ t−1 and φ t ≤ 22ηt √ ρ F L F rψ t . Since when t = 0, φ 0 = 0, we know that the base case of the induction holds. Assume that for every τ ≤ t, we have ψ τ ≥ ψ τ −1 and φ τ ≤ 22ητ √ ρ F L F rψ τ . Consider t + 1 < T . By the induction hypothesis, we have ψ t ≥ ψ 0 ≥ ∆ √ ρF LF r . In addition, since T ≤ 1 180η √ ρF LF r , we know that
Then, we obtain
Since γ > 22 √ ρ F L F r, we have
Then we proceed to show that φ t+1 ≤ 22η(t + 1) √ ρ F L F rψ t+1 . To simplify notation, define C := 22η √ ρ F L F r. Since we have
we know that it suffices to show that
or equivalently C(1 + ηγ) ≥ 11(1 + Ct + C)η ρ F L F r.
One can check that (36) holds due to the facts that γ > 22 √ ρ F L F r, Ct ≤ CT < 1, and C = 22η √ ρ F L F r. Now we complete the induction, and thus (35) holds for every t < T . Then, according to (31) , we obtain 
where the second inequality is due to the fact that ψ 0 ≥ ∆ √ ρF LF r , and the fact that log(1 + 1 2 ηγ) ≥ 1 4 ηγ (recall that ηγ ≤ γ LF ≤ 1), and the third inequality is due to the fact that γ > 720 √ ρ F L F r log( 4rLF ∆ ).
G Robust Estimation Algorithms
In this section, we prove the statistical guarantees given in Section 5 for specific robust algorithms for computing the gradient-value estimates g(w) and F (w).
G.1 Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
We first note that the median-based and trimmed-mean-based robust aggregation of gradients has been analyzed in [72] . Here, we list the results as the following lemmas, and provide the basic idea of converting the robust gradient estimation for smooth functions to robust function value estimation for Lipschitz functions. 
where C θ is a constant that only depends on θ.
Lemma 7.
[72] Suppose that Assumption 3 holds, and that α ≤ β ≤ 1 2 −θ for some constant θ > 0. Let g(w) := trmean β { g i (w)} m i=1 . Assume that for every w ∈ W, ∇f (w; z) is ξ g -sub-exponential. Then, we have with probability at least 1 − 2d(m+1) (1+nm LD) d ,
As we can see, Lemmas 6 and 7 directly lead to the bound for the inexactness ∆ med and ∆ tm .
From gradient estimation to function value estimation. The idea of proving Lemmas 6 and 7 in [72] is a standard covering net argument-proving concentration bounds for finite points in W and then generalizing to a uniform bound across W via the Lipschitz continuity of the partial derivatives. Here, we note that the same method can be used in robust estimation of the function values, as long as the loss functions f (w; z) are M -Lipschitz, since Lipschitz continuity is the only property that is being used to obtain a uniform bound. Therefore, here we skip the details of robust function value estimation. Combining the gradient and function value estimation, we can obtain the final result via union bound.
Algorithm 2 Iterative Filtering [22, 23, 63] Require: corrupted data x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ∈ R d , α ∈ [0, 1 4 ), and algorithm parameter σ > 0. A ← [m], c i ← 1, and τ i ← 0, ∀ i ∈ A. while true do Let W ∈ R |A|×|A| be a minimizer of the convex optimization problem:
and U ∈ R d×d be a maximizer of the convex optimization problem:
G.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Here we only discuss the robust estimation of the gradients. For the same reason as discussed in Appendix G.1, robust estimation of the function values can be analyzed as a special case of gradient estimation. To prove Theorem 4, we first state a result that bounds the error of the iterative filtering algorithm when the original data points {x i } are deterministic. The following lemma is proved in [63] ; also see [66] for additional discussion. 
then the output of the iterative filtering algorithm satisfies µ − µ S 2 ≤ O(σ √ α).
By triangle inequality, we have
where 1 denotes the all-one vector. 4 By choosing
